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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE 0. BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DONALD G. CHANEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9413 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plamtiff-respondent positively rejects the bulk of the 
statement of tacts as given by defendant-appellant as being 
conclusions rather than statement of facts. Therefore, the plain-
tiff-:espondent is constrained to restate the facts more com-
pletely. 
In paragraph l on page 1 of defendant-appellant's brief, 
the defendant-appellant uses the words "extended the contract," 
which is a pure conclusion and not based on any facts. The 
1 
original contract was in writing, was entered into A 
ugust 10 
1959, and reads as follows: · 
"I hereby contract for the construction of a · 
landscaping at 3270 Delmar Drive Salt LakpaCtio and 
' e oun~· 
Utah, and the work to be done and the price to b . 
is as follows: e paid 
"l. To. construct a retaining wall 8' by 8' by 16 of 
cement cinder blocks 4 blocks high and 85 feet Ion 
and to pay for the same $150.00. g 
"2. To construct approximately 800 square foot pat 
of 4 inch standard concrete construction and to pay f~~ 
the same $238.00. 
"3. To plant a lawn on the front, back, and sides of 
the property. Said planning (sic) to consist of 4 inches 
of top soil and multch (sic). The grass to be straight 
Kentucky Blue Grass with 10% White Dutch Clover 
and to pay for the same $505.00. 
"The total cost of $893.00 to be paid upon the com· 
pletion of the work or on completion of the work and 
before August 25, 1959. If the work is completed in 1 
good workmanship manner and 1s not paid for b1 
August 25, 1959, I agree to pay reasonable attorneys 
fees and costs. 
"Dated this 10 day of August, 1959. 
(signed) Donald G. Chane)· 
Exhibit p.1 
Concerning the second agreement, which was oral, the 
defendant-appellant testified as follows: 
"A Well I talked to Mr. Butterfield the same dar 
' I d 't thmk the redwood fence man was there, but on 
he gave me the figure until the following day. 
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"Q When he gave you the figure on the following 
day of $1,000.00, you agreed then to give him an oral 
contract to construct the block fence and the redwood 
fence for $1,000.00? 
"A \X-' e agreed that he was to do the job for 
$L000.00. 
"Q And that was some time after the execution of 
the written agreement? 
"A Yes." (R. 121) 
Cuncernmg the date the oral agreement was entered into, the 
Record at 128 reads as follows: 
"The Court: That is about as close as we can get, 
Mr. King. The 13th or thereabouts is what the Court 
would believe it to be, from his testimony-the 13th 
of August or thereabouts." 
The plaintiff-respondent, however, testified on cross-
exammat10n that this conversation took place August 20th (R. 
69, line 14). Further, in relation to the oral contract of August 
l)th or 20th, defendant-appellant testified as follows: 
· Q Now, you do recall when your deposition was 
taken. do you not? 
"A Yes. 
· 'Q Do you recall this question being asked you: 
'So that the $1,000.00 that was paid took care of the 
contract in dispute, is that right? Not the original 
contract?' 
"Mr. Cardall: What page are you on? 
"Q (By Mr. King) Page 10. And the answer: 'That 
is correct. The $1,000.00 was for the wall.' Now, at the 
time of that conversation-this is line 28: 'A That 
3 
is correct. The $1,000.00 was for 
testified, did you not? 
"A That I said that the -
the wall' So · yo11 
"Q That the $1,000.00 was for the wall? 
"A Well, ahead of that I said I gave him the 
$1,000.00 because the wall had been built and I f 
1
, 
that he had earned the $1,000.00." (R. 130) el 
In regard to the third contract, the defendant-appellant 
testified as follows: 
"A Well, we discussed the fact that the bast was 
poured too high to the surface and it would be im-
possible to make any planting along the wall. And one 
of the things that we talked about was the possibilin' 
of building a planter wall higher than the footmgs and 
putting dirt on top so that we could plant there. 
"Q And no design or no plan of anything was dis-
cussed? 
"A That was 0en the footings were first poured, 
and we discussed it at that time-just the fact that 
something would have to be done. 
'' Q And at no time did you ever authorize or tell 
him to put in the planters? 
"A We discussed it, the possibility for correct~1g 
an error; that was all. 
"Q And then he just went ahead and did it? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Now, do you recall-Coun~el, if you want-~o 
refer to the transcript, I am readmg from page 1 
line 16: 'Q Now, did you agree to pay him anyth~g 
d t 'A No for putting the planter, a planter aroun · . · 
We said we'd take care of it when it was over with, but 
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something had to be done on that. There was never 
a price agreed upon. I came back one day, and it had 
been done.' 
.. A That is right, yes. 
"Q Now, you had discussed in detail how it was 
to be done, had you not? 
·A No; we didn't discuss it. We discussed that 
something had to be done in the way of the planter and 
gettmg top soil on the top of it so that we could plant 
around 1t. 
"Q Now, was there anything discussed about price? 
"A No . 
.. Q You didn't agree upon a price and didn't dis-
cuss price? 
"A No, we didn't discuss the price. We agreed that 
something -
· Q What did you mean when you answered that 
'\v'e'd take care of it when it was over with.' 
"A Getting the top soil in. 
'Q No; I am asking you about what was to be paid 
for it. 
"A That \Yas not my understanding of it. 
"Q I asked you about it and you said 'We said we'd 
take care of it when it was over with, but something 
had to be done on that.' 
"A That is right, yes. 
"Q But there was no discussion or no authorization 
for him to do this work? 
"A No. 
"Q And he went ahead on his own and did it with-
5 
out any discussion with you as to how it was t b 
done--how high, or anything else? 
0 
e 
"A That is right, yes." (R. 140 and 141) 
In view of the above testimony, the court found (Finding 
No. 5): 
"The court further finds that defendant received a 
benefit from the planter boxes and to avoid uniu 
enrichment plaintiff should be awarded payment of sa~t 
based on quantum meruit, and the court further find: 
~here were one hundred and seventy-five blocks placed · 
m the planter and defendant should pay for said blocks 
1 
the wholesale price of seventeen cents each for a tota. · 
of $29.75; the court further finds that top soil sells for 
$12.50 per load, but that plaintiff agreed to furnish the 
top soil for the planters for $10.00 per load, and plain 
tiff furnished two loads of top soil for a total of $20.00: , 
it required the time of two men for six hours to con ' 
struct the planters, at a wage of $2.50 per hour, for a 
total of $30.00; and the court finds that plaintiff shouli 
be awarded in quantum meruit the sum of $79.75 iw 
the planters." (R. 31) 
The court made a finding (No. 2) as follows: 
"Under the written understanding, plaintiff was tc 
prepare the ground and plant a lawn, and the court 
finds that plaintiff planted the lawn in a good, wori 
manlike manner, and that the lawn failed to mature 
and was blown away because of defendant's failJJtf 
and neglecting to keep the new lawn watered and wer 
and the court finds that plaintiff constructed, under 01~ 
written understanding, a retaining wall which w~ 
satisfactory; the plaintiff also did cement work and con 
structed a patio to the plans and specifications provideJ 
by defendant; that part of the cement in the patio 11 
cracking and no evidence was received by the court a• 
6 
to the damages which defendant would suffer by reason 
of defective surfacing of the patio, but plaintiff and 
cltf endant stipulated at the pretrial that a reasonable 
amount to allow defendant would be the sum of $50.00; 
and the court, therefore, finds that plaintiff is entitled 
tu a judgment for the sum of $893.00 as prayed for in 
bis complaint, le~s the $50.00 for the defective sur-
facing, or $843.00 on the written agreement." (R. 
30-31) 
The above finding was based upon the testimony of a witness 
for the defendant-appellant, Willard Erickson, a Landscape 
;,rchitect for Western Garden Center (R. 169, line 29). 
In relation to the occupation of the plaintiff-respondent 
and as to what he respresented himself to be, the defendant-
appellant testified as follows: 
"Q Now, how did you come to choose Mr. Butter-
field? 
"A Through the yellow pages of the telephone 
directory. 
', Q What was he listed under? 
.. A I think it is 1. 0. Butterfield Landscaping." 
(R. 91) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FIND-
ING THAT THE \V"RITTEN CONTRACT WAS EN-
FORCEABLE. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FIND 
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF CAME UNDER THl 
EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN 58-23-2(2) (6), UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY SES 
SION LAWS 1957, CHAPTER 115, PARAGRAPH 
2 
AND SESSION LAWS 1961, CHAPTER 137, PARA: 
GRAPH 2, AS FOUND IN THE 1961 POCKET 
SUPPLEMENT TO VOLUME 6, U.C.A. 1953. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE TEN-
DER OF PLAINTIFF OF EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD 
HA VE FURTHER EXPLAINED AND STRENGTHENED 
THE POSITION OF PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FIND 
ING THAT THE WRITTEN CONTRACT WAS EN ' 
FORCEABLE. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FIND-
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF CAME UNDER THE 
EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN 58-23-2(2) (6), UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY SES-
SION LAWS 1957, CHAPTER 115, PARAGRAPH 2, 
AND SESSION LAWS 1961, CHAPTER 137, PARA-
GRAPH 2, AS FOUND IN THE 1961 POCKET 
SUPPLEMENT TO VOLUME 6, U.C.A. 1953. 
Points I and II are so interrelated that they wil be argued 
together. 
As clearly shown by the evidence, the court was not in 
error in finding that the written contract was enforceable. The 
contract contained three separate jobs. Paragraph 3 provided for 
the planting of the lawn at a cost of $505.00. This clearly 
comes within the exemption of 58-23-2(2), Utah Code An-
notated 1953, as amended by Session Laws 1957, Chapter 115, 
paragraph 2, and Session Laws 1961, Chapter 137, paragraph 2, 
as found in the 1961 Pocket Supplement to Vol. 6, U.C.A. 
1953: 
"Any construction or operation incidental to the 
construction and repair . . . to farming, dairying, agri-
culture, viticulture, horticulture ... " 
Paragraph 1 provided for the construction of a retaining 
'::all for $150.00, and paragraph 2 of the contract provided for 
tl1e construction of a patio at $238.00. The total contract price 
for all three items was $893.00. Items 1 and 2 come clearly 
under the definition of work for which a contractor must have 
a license, and were it not for the exemption provided in para-
9 
graph 6 of 58-23-2 ( 6), Utah Code Annotated 
1 
-, 
d d h . 9)) Q\ amen e , supra, t is contract would not be enf b ' 
orcea le Th 
exemption is as follows: · •c 
"Any work or operation on one uncle t k 
. b [ a Jno i'' proiect y contract or contracts performed d . b 
. d. 1 b ![(([[\ ,,, 
111 uect y y one contractor, the a0rrrel'"ate cont. · ' 
f . . bbb ~~ or which, for labor, matenals and all other , · 
1 Jems , ess than one thousand dollars, such work or op · ' 
. . . . erat1on1 bemg considered as of a casual, m1I1or or mcons · 1 , , egutn t1a nature. 
There cannot be any question that this written agreement 
the first contract, came within the exemption, even ivitho~· 
applying exemption (2) on the law. The total being $893.uu 
it did not exceed the exemption in ( 6). 
Now on the question of the second oral agreement f.ir 
$1,000.00, the record shows that at about the time the prl'JtU 
which was contained in the written agreement was being COIT 
pleted, a contractor came up to bid on a chain link fence. Cp t 
that time, defendant-appellant had planned on having a l1r. 
fence. The bid for this type of fence was too h1;h. and [:1 
defendant-appellant then asked plaintiff-respondent to Die 
on a cement block fence and a redwood fence with gates. Plarn 
tiff-respondent gave him a bid of $1,000.00. The trial cour: 
considered this oral agreement a new and separate pro1ect and 
one not contemplated at the time the written agreement 11a0 
entered into (see argument under Point IV). 
The facts and evidence show that even defendant-appellant 
considered this a different project; and as the block fence was 
satisfactorily completed, he paid for that work. This oral agree 
ment was fully performed and fully paid for. No issues wert 
10 
ioine<l concerning this contract and it was never properly part 
of the litigation. 
Defendant-appellant did not even consider the oral agree-
ment as involved in this litigation until after his disposition 
,.vas raken and they were apparently trying to find some legal 
basis for not paying a legitimate debt. They discussed that 
plaintiff-respondent was a landscaper and not a contractor. 
Building a cinder block fence constituted the work of a con-
rrJctor. Hence, if the amount exceeded $1,000.00 a license 
1vould be required. This theory in defense will not work unless 
they can bring in the block fence and lump all the projects 
cogether for a total amount in excess of $1,000.00. When the 
original contract was entered into, it contained all the things 
thrn planned by defendant-appellant and constituted one plan 
and one project. When defendant-appellant learned that a link 
fenc~ woulei cost more than he was prepared to pay, and having 
seen the good work plaintiff-respondent had done on the 
rttaining wall, he asked for a bid on the block fence and 
redwood fence. The price being agreeable, they entered into 
the oral agreement. This was a completely new project not 
originally contemplated. This project was completed satisfac-
torily and was paid for and defendant-appellant should not 
now be permitted to slip it into the litigation for the sole pur-
pose of avoiding payment of a legitimate debt. 
Had defendant-appellant properly watered the lawn and it 
had matured, there perhaps would not have been any litigation. 
Through the neglect of defendant-appellant (as shown by 
the record and findings of the trial court), he tries to blame 
his neglect on plaintiff-respondent and so refuses to pay and 
this litigation is the result. 
11 
Defendant-appellant states in his brief on page / "T \), he 
work agreed upon by the parties hereto was for the g ' 
ener;,] 
landscaping and improvement of appellant's grounds." If thii 
statement is true and it was all general landscaping th , en it 
would come under exemption ( 2) set out above, and woutd 
not constitute a defense. 
Further, on page 6 of defendant-appellant's brief. '\vhi\.: 
still on the premises with equipment and men and proceedin, 
as agreed, was extended modifications which related to th; 
contract." By no stretch of the imagination was the writt:n 
agreement modified. The plaintiff-respondent performed the 
written agreement exactly as provided therein with no changes 
of any kind, and nothing which he did thereafter in any manne: 
related to the original contract. On page 7 of defendant 
appellant's brief, he states, "the Court had difficulty 1n holdinF 
that this was all more than one project." (R. 228) A careful 
reading of the record will show this was a misunderstanding. 
All the court was saying was that the written agreement was 
one project, not that all of the work done on the property w;s 
one project. 
On the question of the word "project" as used bv tiit 
statute, I was only able to find two cases, both from Montana 
State ex rel. Turner v. Patch et al., 210 Pac. 748 (1922). at 
page 748: 
"The words ·single purpose,' as used in Const art 
13, paragraph 5, limiting to $10,000 the liability tn . 
currable by a county for a single purpose, means, accord· 
ing to approved usage, one object, project, or propasi 
tion · a unit isolated from all others made up of ek 
men,ts which constitute an entity; something completetr 
12 
itself, but separate and apart from other objects; 'single' 
meaning one only, being a unit; alone; detached; one 
which 1s abstracted from others; 'purpose' being that 
which one sets before him to accomplish; an end, 
mtent10n, or aim, object, plan, proposition, project." 
On page 750: 
·'We do not mean to mtlmate that comm1ss1oners 
may. by making arbitrary or artificial divisions of work 
which manifestly constitutes but one project, and by 
issuing separate warrants to separate contractors for 
separate units thus created, evade the prohibition of the 
Constitution, but we do say that in no proper sense 
of the terms can it be held that, as applied to this road-
work a culvert at Mondak, a cut at Froid, a fill at 
Culbertson, the removal of an obstruction at Poplar, 
the repair of a defect at Wolf Point, and the leveling 
of the surface at Bainville constitute one project, or 
that warrants severally issued for these separate pieces 
of work represent an indebtedness or liability for a 
single purpose, even though these points are all con-
nected by the public roads of the county." 
In the State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of County Commis-
sioners of Yellowstone County et al., 109 P.2d 1106 ( 1941), 
on page 1106: 
"An emergency budget of $15,000 for general relief 
purposes in county where 931 persons were dependent 
upon general relief was not an indebtedness or liability 
for any 'single purpose' within legislative and consti-
tutional provisions that no county shall incur any in-
debtedness or liability for any single purpose to an 
amount exceeding $10,000 without the approval of a 
majority of the electors thereof, since whether relief 
shall be extended to any particular person depends upon 
facts relating to him alone and not to other persons 
seeking relief." 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The contract provided: 
"If the work is completed in a good workmansh 
manner and is not paid for by August 25, 1959, I agr~~ 
to pay reasonable attorney's fee and costs." (R. 2) 
The pretrial order provided: 
"The defendant denies liability, but in the event the 
Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to attornevs 
fees from the defendant, 25% of any amount recover~d 
by the plaintiff, it is admitted by the defendant, would 
be reasonable." (R. 28) 
The purpose of providing for attorney's fees and costs is 
to provide relief where it is necessary to bring an action to 
enforce payment. The court awarded judgment for $843.00 oo 
the written contract and under the pretrial agreement plaintifi-
respondent should be awarded judgment for attorney's fees io 
the amount of $210.00. No attorney's fees should be allowed 
on the quantum meruit. Clearly, the intent of the parties was 
that an attorney's fee and costs would be paid if suit were 
necessary. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE TEN-
DER OF PLAINTIFF OF EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD 
HAVE FURTHER EXPLAINED AND STRENGTHENED 
THE POSITION OF PLAINTIFF. 
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Defendant-appellant states in his brief, at page 7: 
·'The Respondent accepted the construction of the 
cement block wall a short time after he began work on 
the lawn. He stopped work on the lawn and proceeded 
with the fence. After completing the fence, he returned 
to finish the lawn. App~l,lant respectively submits that 
this clearly shows the interrelationship of the work." 
This statement in defendant-appellant's brief strongly points 
up the importance of the tender which plaintiff-respondent 
made as shown in the record: 
"Mr. King: It is our position, Your Honor, that this 
occurred at-this conversation in regards to the wall 
fence occurred considerably later than what Mr. Chaney 
testifies to and that the work was materially progress-
ing and had progressed and that it was necessary for 
Butterfield to haul in clay and prepare the ground here 
in order to set the footings on it; that had he known 
that this fence was to be constructed, part of that three 
loads of material that they had to haul away, of course 
not the rocks-part of that three loads of material that 
they had to haul away, he could have taken and used 
down here as a base for this retaining wall and at a 
saving in expense and his testimony will be that he had 
to haul in clay and had to haul in material to form a 
base to set that cement on for that retaining wall. 
"The Court: Well, he knew or should have known 
that when he signed this." (R. 203) 
··Mr. King: My whole purpose in bringing this in 
was merely to show that had this been-this whole 
thing been one project, that the project could have been 
handled and would have been handled in a more eco-
nomical manner and my purpose in introducing it is 
to show that it is not the entire thing-the entire thing 
is not a joint project. 
15 
"The Court: If they contended that th 1 
· h · h b e oral c versat10n w K . rought about the building of the on 
fence occurred rn advance of or si·mult 
1 
block 
aneous y · · 
the signing of this, then I would permit Witn 
into it. you to gn 
"Mr. Cardall: But we do not, Your Honor." (R. 
205-206) 
And further: 
"The Court: Yes, and I must sustain the objection 
You may now call Mr. Butterfield back. · ' 
"Mr. King: Mr. Reporter, you took the argument and . 
so we make the statements which I made in my argu ' 
ment as a tender and obiect to the ruling of the Court 
"The Court: And as a tender, the tender is refused. 
(R. 206) 
The purpose of the tender is set out above in the tender 
itself, and so further additional statements should not be 
necessary. Even without this evidence, the court correctly found 
that each of the transactions was a separate project and a 
separate undertaking, and arrived at the correct conclusion 
without the necessity of admitting the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KARL V. KING 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
16 
